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THE JUDGE AND THE GRAND JUIRY
ANDREW A. BRucE

In a presidential address which'was delivered by Frank J. Loesdh
on January 21, 1932, before the Board of Directors of the Chicago
Crime Commission and which was subsequently given to the press,
the following statement was made:
"Some things in my experience stand out to which I feel I must
call attention.

.

.

.

I do not do it in any spirit of captious criti-

cism but in the interest of the public welfare and of truth as I see it.
"The mandate of the Illinois Constitution that 'the terms of the
Criminal Court of Cook County shall be held by one or more judges
of the Circuit and Superior Courts of Cook County, as nearly as may
be in alternation, as may be determined by said judges,' is ignored and
has been for years past.
"The purpose of the provision cannot be misunderstood. It was
to make each judge, without exception, of the Circuit and Superior
Courts, take his place in the Criminal Court to give to it, to the public, and to the criminal and the unfortunate coming before him the
benefit of his dignity, standing and learning and to give to the judges
the experience which can only come from sitting in that court in the
making of all-around experienced and learned judges and to prevent
any effective working of that alliance between crime and politics which
has become so disgraceful in the non-enforcement of our criminal laws
against the organized or politician-aided criminal.
"If the judges themselves refuse to comply with their sworn
duty and a plain command of the Constitution because the duty it
commands is a disagreeable one, the layman may well be excused
from questioning why he should be expected to obey the Constitution
or laws where it is troublesome, inconvenient or disagreeable for him
to do so.
"The low esteem in which the Criminal Court of Cook County
is held is due, in my opinion, to just that refusal of each of the judges
of the Circuit and Superior Courts to take his turn in sitting in that
court as the Constitution requires he shall do.
"If all our able and upright judges, many of whom now avoid
all contamination with the Criminal Court, will alternate with all their
brethren by sitting in that court for six months at a time, it would
give them at the most only two sittings in the six years' period. It
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would do more to curb crime and speed justice to the criminal
and give safety to the public in life and property than all the different
remedies which have-been proposed to secure those ends.
"The manifest result of so many of the judges refusing to do
their sworn duty is to open places in the Criminal Court for long
spaces of time to some inexperienced, timid, ignorant, subservient or
mountebank judges whose presence on the bench would not be tolerated for a day if the public were not made helpless by the bipartisan
deals between party politicians in putting up for their selfish ends only
one set of judicial candidates and thereby depriving the voters of
that choice among candidates which the Constitution makers tried
to secure to the voters.
"The result is what may be expected. The look backward is
startling in contrast to the present. Such judges as McAllister, Gary,
Rogers, Grinnell, Moran and Tuley and others like them sat in the
Criminal Court, with independence, dignity, learning and impartiality,
and justice was administered; criminals were not bargained with and
there was no pull with the court to be easy on them."
He then gave an example of the somewhat crass ignorance of
an unnamed judge in dismissing a return of habeas corpus and then
later of what he termed "a mountebank performance" in which a
colloquy was held between a sitting judge, also unnamed, and a complaining witness who claimed to be a spiritualist and to be able to talk
with the departed. He then said:
"Another judge has earned the nickname of 'Probation.' He is
commonly so referred to in the criminal court. It is said he has openly
boasted in court that he is the easiest judge in the criminal court. He
has openly arbitrarily waived aside questions and prosecutors' objections with the remark, 'I am the Supreme Court.' His attitude
and actions on the bench are discreditable. One cannot within proper
terms sufficiently characterize his unjudicial conduct and lack of dignity on the bench.
"Another judge -makes it a point to advise defendants that if
they plead guilty he will be lenient with them but if they force a
jury trial they will get the limit. He is so anxious to avoid jury trials
that in two instances of record he changed the indictments from murder to assault and sentenced the defendants to terms in the House
of Correction.
"In the municipal court we have a judge who has sat a number
of times in the criminal branches of that court. He also has acquired
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a nickname-it is 'Cash' Register.' To what depths must a judge
have sunk to earn such a sobriquet?
"These few instances are sufficient to illustrate the statements
I have made that the administration of criminal justice does not need
changes in the laws so much as a change in the attitude on the part of
those charged with the administration of the laws.
"It is hardly necessary for me to say that I make no general
charge against all judges for I have a high respect for many of them
and we have many judges who must feel as strongly as I do concerning the conduct of the judges whose actions I have criticized."
To this utterance exception was taken by the Chief justice of the
Cook County Criminal Court, who called in the members of the
grand jury then in session, made a defense to them of the practice
of ignoring the constitutional provision for the sitting of judges in
rotation and the assigning of certain members of the Circuit and
Supreme Benches to sit in the Criminal Branch or Criminal Court
and stated that:
"There may be inexperienced, timid, and maybe even ignorant,
judges, but if there are subservient or mountebank judges serving on
this Bench it is another matter which must be investigated. If these
charges are true, these men should be driven from the Bench and
should be prevented from holding office in this community."
He then read Mr. Loesch's statement in regard to the so-called
"cash register" judge in the Municipal Court and then said: "If
there is a judge who earned that nick-name because of what he actually does, then it is cowardly not to name him. It is not right to
leave the public to guess who might be so low. If there is such a
judge it is your duty to find out, and if there is enough proof so that
he can be named publicly, then there ought to be enough proof to
indict him and then to delve immediately into all the proof available
without regard to who may be hit and if the evidence justifies an
indictment it is your duty to bring one in. Your inquiry is not to be
limited to this one judge. If you find evidence of corruption in any
court, no matter who is affected, I want you to act on it. There can
be no graver charge than corruption on the part of a judge. On the
other hand, if no evidence exists there is no graver charge than the
maligning of judges to the extent that a large part of the public might
believe such charges. If this (the Loesch statement) goes unchallenged, the respect for the law will disappear. . . . If the charges
are not true, it is a conspiracy to slander and libel the judges as a
group. It is a conspiracy to interfere with the due administration

JUDGE AND GRAND JURY

of justice. Under our law the libeling of a group, whether it be
judges, bankers, preachers, or carpenters, is a crime."
In response to these instructions the grand jury issued a subpoena
to Mr. Loesch to appear before them. On his appearance, he was
asked by Mr. Thomas Marshall, who had been appointed as a special
attorney in the case by the Chief Justice Fisher, to sign the so-called
immunity waiver before testifying before the jury. This Mr. Loesch
refused to do; his statement being that he was not a criminal, did
not stand accused of any crime, was present merely to answer a grand
jury subpoena, and stood ready to answer any questions propounded;
that he understood, however, that the general purpose of the inquiry
was to indict some one or more judges if he, Mr. Loesch, could produce sufficient evidence to that, or failing to do that, then it was the
purpose to indict some one or more officers of the Crime Commission
or to lay a foundation for a libel suit. He stated that he had not
libeled anyone, that he had nothing to hide, and that his motiveg
and the records of the Crime Commission were open to critical inspection.
Upon his thus refusing to sign the waiver the grand jury dismissed Mr. Loesch from the jury room. Later, however, the members
of the grand jury concluded that they would like to hear from him
without the signing of the waiver, and the foreman of the grand jury
followed Mr. Loesch into the hall and asked him if he would so
testify. Mr. Loesch replied that he would, and went back into the
room where an examination was begun.
On this examination, however, the special prosecuting attorney
was excluded from the jury room. On learning of these facts the
Chief Justice summoned the jury before him, but was informed that
they were engaged in investigation and could not or would not come
at that time. The judge then summoned a number of bailiffs and instructed them, if necessary, to break into the jury room and to escort
the jury before him. It does not seem to have been necessary to
break down the doors as the officers were allowed to enter but the
members of the grand jury were nevertheless escorted before the
judge by the bailiffs, two of them being entrusted to the arduous
duty of escorting Mr. Loesch who, we might incidentally state, is a
lawyer of national reputation and a veteran of eighty-one years of age.
On the jury thus appearing, the foreman, Mr. Henry S. Henschen, the
President of the Chicago Bank of Commerce and 'also a well-known
and reputed citizen, was severely criticized by the judge for talking
to Mr. Loesch in the ante-room, for excluding the special prosecuting
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attorney, and for refusing to appear before the court when first summoned. An attempt was also made, but afterwards abandoned by the
Judge, to withdraw the consideration of the case from the grand jury
and to leave it for the consideration of the next body which was to
convene a few days afterwards.
The result of the whole matter was a more or less change of
front on the part of the Chief Justice, a withdrawal of some of his
criticisms and the return of the grand jury to the jury room and a
very short examination of Mr. Loesch and of Colonel Henry Barrett
Chamberlin, the Director of the Crime Commission, without the presence of the prosecuting attorney and the waiver of immunity; and,
no positive evidence of corruption being produced and which appeared
to the jury to be sufficient on which to base an indictment, the return
of no such bills of indictment, either against any judge or against Mr.
Loesch and his associates, for conspiracy.
These proceedings, though perhaps to some seemingly unnecessary
and perhaps not the right method by which to meet the accusation,
like many other similar legal proceedings are full of interest and
of significance. What is the province and the prerogative of the
grand jury? Must it allow the state's attorney, or other prosecuting
officer, to be present during its deliberations? Have the members of
a grand jury the right to ask questions, to obtain clues, or to investigate personally outside of the jury room, or are they concerned only
with the testimony that is brought before them by the prosecuting
attorney or other witnesses whom they may have formally summoned?
Is it a contempt of the Bench to make a statement of a more or less
public rumor or of a well known state of facts, which, if true, may
be discreditable to that body? May a citizen comment on the existence of a public rumor and then regret the existence of that rumor?
As far as the last point is concerned we hardly think that there
is any such limitation on public criticism, that is to say, if indulged
in, as was undoubtedly the case in the present instance, not from
malicious motives but as the utterance of a public-spirited citizen.
Mr. Loesch's statement, indeed, was a statement of facts as he saw
them with a regret attached. In the Municipal Court he said, "We
have a Judge who has sat a number of times in the criminal branches
of the court. He also had a nickname-It is 'Cash Register.' To
what depths must a Judge have sunk to have earned such a sobriquet?"
This was perhaps strong language, especially the comment, but if the
facts were true the comment was inevitable. There can be no doubt
of the right and duty of Chief Justice Fisher to inquire into the matter.
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There was, however, hardly ground to believe that the statement was
made as a part of a conspiracy.
Parallel instances have occurred in both legal and academic circles.
Not long since there was a popular professor in one of our State
universities. He specialized in bacteriology and entomology and knew
everything of the insect world. On account of this fact the students
gave him the nickname of "Old Bugs." At first this appellation, being,
as it was, a term of endearment, did no particular harm. Later, however, the Professor was elected President of the University. He
then was called "Prexy Bugs." This was unfortunate. The bug
kingdom is a large one and includes the cootie as well as bugs of a
nobler ancestry and who pursue a more useful method of obtaining
a living. The term "Prexy Bugs" certainly did not add to the dignity
of the new President or of the Presidential office. It might have been
misunderstood by strangers and by the public at large. Yet one could
hardly have prosecuted these students for criminal libel and much less
have prosecuted one who happened to learn of the general use of the
appellation and expressed his regret concerning the fact.
Mr. Loesch was not- engaged in uttering a libel but in stating
facts and regretting their existence. Judge Fisher was certainly justified and should have the support of the whole community in his
attempt to probe into the matter. He was certainly justified in his
first charge to the jury in which he told them to investigate the matter
and to bring in indictments again recreant judges, if any there were,
and if legal evidence was presented to them which would justify any
such action. He was in error, however, in later charging them that
if Mr. Loesch failed to produce evidence sufficient to warrant an indictment that he himself should be indicted for criminal libel.
The criticism too that was made by the judge on the refusal of
the grand jury to allow the special prosecuting officer to remain in
the jury room and also his action in summoning the jury before him
in the peremptory manner in which fie did were without warrant, and
it was only fair to the judge to state that he acted hurriedly and
afterwards realized and admitted the error committed. A state's attorney, and much less a specially appointed prosecuting officer, is certainly no part of, and certainly is not necessary to, the composition
of a grand jury. The grand jury in Illinois is essentially the grand
jury of the common law. Though nothing was said concerning it in
the Constitutions of 1818, 1848, and 1870, the Supreme Court, and
on account of section 10 of article 8 of the Constitution of 1848,
which provides that "no person shall for any indictable offense be
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proceeded against criminally by information," presumed its existence.
That Court also has expressly stated that the grand jury is the grand
jury of the common law. The legislative act of February 4, 1819
[laws of 1819, page 3] expressly declared'that such law as existed
prior to the fourth year of James I should be the common law of the
new commonwealth. Though the common law brought with it the
grand jury into Illinois it certainly did not bring with it the state's
attorney. The state's attorney, indeed, was unknown to the early
colonists and it is only after the American Revolution that we find
traces of him. Whether he was brought to America from France
or through our lawyers of Scotch descent is a mooted question. He
certainly was not indigenous to the English or the American soil.
The grand jury, on the other hand, is of very ancient origin.
Some claim that a similar institution existed among the Anglo Saxons,
but others, and perhaps with more accuracy, insist that it was of
Frankish lineage and was introduced into England after the conquest.
It certainly was recognized by the Assize of Clarendon, A. D. 1166,
which enacted "that inquiry be made in each county and in each 100
by 12 lawful men of the 100 and 4 lawful men of every township,
who are sworn to say truly whether in their 100 or township there
is any man accused of being or notorious as a robber or a murderer
or a thief or anybody who is a harborer of robbers or murderers or
thieves since the king began to reign and this let the justices and the
sheriffs inquire, each officer before himself." (Lesser's History of
the Jury System, 138). This certainly denotes an investigatory body
and, though later on the grand jury has been principally used as a
shield for the defense of the suspect and as a bulwark against unjust
and uncalled for prosecutions, it certainly has had both an accusing
and investigatory function for a long period of time.
Though, too, custom and statutes have provided for the appearance before grand juries of state's attorneys and other prosecuting
officers, these officers must generally be held to appear for the convenience of the grand jury and are not necessary to their deliberation.
Though the constitutions and statutes of our various states differ and
though few if any courts have been willing to set aside an indictment
on the ground that such officers were present, almost every state has
limited the function of the prosecuting officer to the presentation of
evidence and has precluded him from arguing on it or urging an
indictment. We also have yet to find a single case in which an indictment has been set aside because the prosecuting officer was not present. Some decisions have even gone to the length of excluding such
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officer altogether. Lung's case, 1 Conn. 428; Lewis B. Wake, 74, N.
Car. 194. All that our own Illinois courts say is that,, as far as the
defendant and the motion to quash the indictment is concerned, there
is in this state no statute forbidding such presence and it is permissible
under the common law Regent v. People, 96 111. App. 189, 197; and
that "he may be present to give advice, to interrogate witnesses, to
draw such bills as the jurors are prepared to find and to give such
general instructions as they may require, but he is not to influence
or direct them in respect to the findings, nor he to be present when
they are deliberating upon the evidence or when their vote is taken.
Gitchell v. People, 146 ll. 178, 187 and I Bishop on Crim. Proc. (2d
ed.) section 861. Nowhere is there any intimation that his presence
is necessary unless it is desired by the jury.
There certainly, too, is no justification for the complaint of the
judge that the foreman of the grand jury spoke to Mr. Loesch while
in the hallway and asked him if he was willing to testify without
signing the immunity waiver. As we have before stated, the grand
jury is an investigatory as well as an indicting body. It is sworn
to make diligent inquiry "and to present all infractions of the criminal law which may be given to the body in charge or may come to the
knowledge of any of them touching the service in which they are engaged." In speaking of this power the Supreme Court of Georgia
in re Lester, Mayor, 77 Ga. 143 says, "Anything that they can find out
by their own inquiry and observation is legitimate and praiseworthy,
but they have no authority to force private persons or the officers
of other courts to disclose to them who have violated the laws and the
names of persons by whom such infractions can be established." They
are not dependent alone upon the evidence which the prosecuting
attorney chooses to put before them. They have the power to investigate the controversy from all angles and to find out where they
can get evidence.
In the case of Ward v. State (1829) 2 Mo. 120, where without
any particular accusation first having been made, the foreman of the
jury summoned a witness and asked him if he knew of any person or
persons having been at a Faro table in the county within the last
twelve months, the Supreme Court of Missouri said, "I take this
to be an ordinary case where perhaps the jury had probable cause
to believe that some offenses had been committed against law; and
that so believing they desired in the discharge of their oaths, and of
their duties to the county to inquire; and how should they inquire?
Not by going into the secret recesses of gamblers and gambling devices
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to ask and seek information, but to send for persons who might in
their opinion be most likely to possess evidence relating to these
matters. It is a solemn and important duty that every citizen owes
to his country to give evidence in the courts of justice against offenders against the peace and good order of the community. A grand
jury should be considered trustworthy in this matter. They stand as
a rampart between a malicious or incensed prosecution in case of life
and' death; no man can be brought to trial on the lowest or the
highest offenses known to the law unless the grand jury shall say so,
yet they are not to be trusted with the power to send for witnesses,
till some malignant prosecutor or some injured person shall cause
an indictment to be sent up to them! This would strip them of their
greatest utility, would convert them into a mere engine, to be acted
upon by Circuit Attorneys or those who might choose to use them.
This point is untenable."
All that the foreman asked of Mr. Loesch in the hallway was
whether he was willing to testify without signing the immunity waiver.
Even if the foreman had asked him if he had any knowledge of the
cases and the nature of that knowledge, though perhaps the witness
would not have been required to answer, the juryman had a perfect
right to ask the question. Grand Juries are not dependent on the
state's attorney for the obtaining of their witnesses. Though they
are not required to visit the gambling joint for the obtaining of evidence, it is within their power to do so. It is true that the evidence
on which an indictment is voted should be presented to the whole
jury, but preliminary investigations may be made anywhere.
Certainly, also, Mr. Loesch was justified in refusing to sign the
so-called immunity waiver. As he himself stated, he was not a criminal nor had he been accused of a crime. He had been summoned as
a witness merely. He was perfectly willing to tell the jury all that
he knew. It is, indeed, difficult to see how anyone could have believed
that it was improper for the jury to consider his evidence without any
such waiver being signed. The Federal Statute expressly makes such
witnesses immune and we have yet to learn that, even in the Federal
courts, the grand jurors refuse to examine the cases and organize
strikes because of the existence of the statute.
We believe, also, that the Chief Justice was unwarranted in
summoning the jury before him in the way in which he did. They
constituted an independent body. They had the power even to indict the judge who presided over the court. They could indict the
state's attorney or any other persons. While deliberating they should
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have been immune from all unnecessary interruption. Cases in this
line are of ancient origin. In the Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial, 1681, 8
How. St. Tr. 759, 771, we find a case in which a motion was made
that the evidence be heard in court and in which the jury stated to the
chief justice that "It is the opinion of the jury that they ought to
examine the witnesses in private and it has been the constant practice
of our ancestors and predecessors to do it; and they insist upon it as
their right to examine them in private as they are bound to keep the
king's secrets which they can not do if it be done in court; then,
besides, the jury do apprehend that in private they are more free to
examine things in particular for the satisfying of their own consciences, and that without fear or affection; and we hope we shall do
our duty." It is true that in this particular case the jury afterwards
yielded, but in yielding the foreman stated, "My Lord, the gentlemen of the jury desire that it may be recorded that we insisted upon
it as our right, but if the court overrule we must submit to it."
These were brave words at the time of James II, when the judges
even were appointed by the king and in the age of judges like Judge
Jeffreys. As we have before stated, however, Judge Fisher was*undoubtedly justified in his desire to probe the accusations to the bottom
and if any judges were recreant to their oaths of office to drive them
from the bench. He was certainly right in trying to maintain the
dignity of the courts against unjust accusations. The writer, too,
is one of those who believe that though courageous and high-minded
as the words and deeds of Mr. Loesch were and always are, there
was a measure of injustice in speaking of cash register and harlequin
judges without specifying their names. It is hardly fair to a court
composed of several judges to state that one of them is known as a
harlequin or a cash register expert. Since the charge is general, the
public may fit it to anyone whom they please. The accuser, in short,
knows of whom he speaks; the public does not; and the cloud rests
over all.

